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Abstract
People with autism are often characterized as having difficulties with theory of mind abilities such as emotion recognition. 
However, rather than being a pervasive deficit of ‘mindblindness,’ a number of studies suggests these difficulties vary by 
context, and when people with autism mindread non-human agents, such as animals or cartoons, these abilities improve. To 
replicate this effect, 15 adolescents with both autism and intellectual disability participated in a test of facial emotion recogni-
tion, with both human and animal faces. Participants performed significantly better on the animal version of the assessment 
compared to the human version, and human rather than animal scores were the strongest predictor of symptom severity. 
These results were shown to be primarily driven by improvement in recognition of the emotions happiness and anger in ani-
mal rather than human faces. Implications with regards to social motivation and theory of mind interventions are discussed.
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Theory of mind (ToM), also known as mindreading, refers 
to the ability to both infer and predict thoughts and emotions 
in other people by using contextual and interpersonal cues, 
such as recognizing changes in facial expressions (Premack 
and Woodruff 1978). A large body of research indicates that 
people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have difficul-
ties with ToM abilities such as emotion recognition (Lozier 
et al. 2014).
For instance, Sucksmith et al. (2013) looked at differences 
in facial emotion recognition performance using the Karo-
linska Directed Emotional Faces test (KDEF) (Lundqvist 
et al. 1998) between adults with ASD, parents of a child 
with ASD, and unaffected members of the general popula-
tion. They found that only participants with ASD showed 
difficulty identifying emotions, particularly the emotions 
happy, angry and afraid. This is in line with other research 
indicating that individuals with ASD have difficulty with 
these emotions. For instance, Spencer et al. (2011) found 
differences in neural activation levels between those with 
ASD and their siblings relative to controls in response to 
viewing happy faces.
Interestingly, a number of studies suggest that the magni-
tude of these difficulties vary according to the characteristics 
of the agent being mindread. Specifically, when autistic peo-
ple mindread human agents, ToM abilities are at a greater 
deficit than when mindreading non-human agents with 
anthropomorphic features, including animals and cartoons 
(for a review see Atherton and Cross 2018). For example 
Brosnan et al. (2015) showed that individuals with autism 
have improved emotion recognition when interpreting the 
emotions of anthropomorphic (cartoon) versus typically 
human stimuli. Additionally Atherton and Cross (2019) have 
also found similar patterns in the broader autism spectrum 
using non visual, perspective taking ToM task. Interestingly, 
Golan et al. (2010) showed that anthropomorphising faces 
(by transposing them on to vehicles) can improve emotion 
recognition in individuals with ASD, thus highlighting the 
potential pragmatic avenue to interventions for this work. 
However the vast majority of this work has been done on 
individuals with IQ in the typical range, which is not entirely 
representative of the entire autism spectrum.
Autism is a particularly heterogeneous condition, approx-
imately 55% of those with ASD also have co-occuring intel-
lectual disability and more severe symptomology than those 
with average IQ scores (Charman et al. 2011). Despite this, 
 * Gray Atherton 
 gray.s.atherton@vanderbilt.edu
1 Department of Psychology, Edge Hill University, 
Ormskirk L39 4QP, UK
2 Psychology Department, School of Science, University 
of Buckingham, Buckingham MK18 1EG, UK
 Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
1 3
the majority of research into autism relies on a high func-
tioning sample with average IQ scores, due to a need for 
matched control groups (Ozonoff et al. 1990). It is there-
fore unclear clear whether people with autism who have 
more severe functional impairments also show improved 
ToM when agents are non-human. Therefore, the present 
study explores whether individuals with autism, who are 
characterized as low functioning, also show improved ToM 
towards non-human or anthropomorphic agents compared 
to typically human agents.
Methods
Participants and Ethics
Fifteen adolescents from a residential school for individu-
als with severe autism and intellectual disabilities in the 
East Midlands area of the UK, aged 12–17 years old, (M 
age = 15.33, SD = 1.54, four females) participated in the 
study. The developmental ages of the sample ranged from 4 
to 10 years, supplied by occupational therapists at the school. 
All participants had been diagnosed with autism and more 
than half also had a formal diagnosis of co-occurring intel-
lectual disability given by their general practitioners. Almost 
all had a co-occurring mental health diagnosis. Each par-
ticipant was also assessed using the Gillian Asperger Diag-
nostic Scale (GADS) (Gilliam 2001) (mean score = 80.07, 
SD = 8.30, range 70–98). Please see Table 1 for participant 
characteristics.
The GADS is a 32-item norm-referenced rating scale. 
Respondents rate the individual in question on the frequency 
of ASD indicative behaviors across four subscales: social 
interaction, restricted patterns of behavior, cognitive pat-
terns, and pragmatic skills. The GADS can not only be used 
to identify individuals with ASD, but to also document the 
severity of behaviors, as it can be used to document behavio-
ral progress. The use of the GADS therein is that it is able to 
both identify the presence of ASD, and qualify the severity 
of ASD related behaviors. Importantly, testing for the GADS 
requires responders to be limited to individuals who have 
had sustained contact with the individual (Campbell 2005), 
thus strengthening external validity. When recruiting for 
the study, all students with a diagnosis of autism were ver-
bally invited to take part, and parental consent forms were 
obtained from the parent/guardian of any individual who 
expressed interest. Ethical approval was granted by the Uni-
versity of University of Buckingham Ethics Review Board.
Design, Procedure and Materials
This study employed a within-groups design with one inde-
pendent variable, Presentation Type, having two levels, 
Original Human and Animal Filter. This study was run in 
person, with participants tested individually in a quiet class-
room during school hours by the one of the researchers. A 
single session lasted about 30 min.
As this study required participants to match words with 
pictures, it was necessary to first confirm that individuals 
were able to understand both the words and the task. Thus, 
in the first phase of the study, the experimenter laid out five 
laminated notecards, each displaying a simple emoji face 
representing one of the five basic emotions to be tested 
(Angry, Sad, Afraid, Happy and Surprised). These emo-
jis were also in use therapeutically at the school, and thus 
familiar to the students. One at a time, the participant was 
given one laminated notecard upon which one of the same 
five basic emotion words were written and read a definition 
and example for the given emotion. The participants were 
then instructed to place the word card on top of the relevant 
emoji (order of presentation randomised). All 15 participants 
passed this check for all five words.
In the second phase, the five emotion word cards used in 
phase one were laid in front of the participant. They were 
then told they would be shown several pictures of faces, and 
their job was to place the correct word on top of the face. 
After every trial the participant was asked a check ques-
tion of “Are you sure?” and this was only asked once. If 
an answer was changed after asking “Are you sure?” then 
this was the answer that was recorded. This procedure was 
used because this sample showed difficulty at times with 
sustained attention, and it could be unclear whether they 
were sufficiently engaged in the task on their initial choice.
There were twenty emotion pictures used in total, ten 
of human faces, and the same ten pictures of human faces 
instead shown in an animal filter. All face pictures were 
Table 1  Participant characteristics
Gender Age GADS score Diagnoses
M 12 82 Autism, ADD, Tourette’s
M 15 79 Autism, ID
M 16 79 Autism, ID
M 16 74 Autism
M 16 78 Autism, ADHD, ID
M 16 96 Autism, ADD
M 16 98 Autism
M 16 71 Autism, ID
M 17 71 Autism, ID, ADHD
M 17 77 Autism, ID
M 17 83 Autism, ADHD
F 13 70 Autism, ID
F 13 85 Autism
F 15 75 Autism, ID
F 15 83 Autism
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taken from the KDEF and used four different models (two 
male, two female). Each of the five emotions first tested 
at baseline were tested twice in each condition (Original 
Human and Animal Filter), with each emotion displayed 
with a male and a female face. All face images were pic-
tured head-on, in full color, and filled a full letter size page 
(8.5 × 11 ins). Please see Table 2 for the items.
The ten pictures that made up the Original Human emo-
tion set were unaltered from the original KDEF test. For 
the Animal Filter set, these same ten pictures were put 
through an animal filter process (retrieved from http://
funny .pho.to/human -to-anima l-monta ges/). All female 
faces were presented in a lion filter, and male faces in 
a gorilla filter. There were color differences between the 
human and animal faces, specifically, the animal filters 
recolored the faces to fit the respective animal theme. 
However, research suggests that these lower level per-
ceptual differences do not affect emotion recognition 
(Calvo and Nummenmaa 2011). Importantly, the animal 
images did not change the inner aspects of the face (aka 
eye size, mouth positioning), meaning that this filter did 
not affect higher level face elements that could explain 
any performance differences. This means that the differ-
ences between animal and human faces used in the study 
are not simply a product of increasing the salience of 
the high level aspects of the face (aka the eyes) but are 
instead a factor of the context in which the face/emotion 
is presented.
Half of the participants saw the Animal Filter set first 
and the other half the Original Human set first. Within a 
Table 2  The original and anthropomorphic stimuli
Original Human Animal Filtered
Happy
Surprised
Sad
Afraid
Angry
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set the pictures were shown one at a time in random order, 
and the word cards placed in front of participants were 
shuffled each round.
Results
The data’s distr ibutions (Animal Filter Pictures, 
SW(15) = .93, p = .273, Original Human Pictures, 
SW(15) = .943, p = .427, GADS SW(15) = .898, p = .089) 
did not significantly differ from normality. Data was 
examined for outliers using box plots in line with recom-
mendations by Field (2017), and none were identified. 
Matched Samples t tests showed that individuals per-
formed the emotion recognition task significantly more 
accurately with the Animal Filter (M = 7.33, SD = 2.093), 
than the Original Human pictures (M = 5.2, SD = 2.455), 
T(14) = 3.506, p = .003, d = 0.92, (please see Fig. 1). A 
simple linear regression also showed that GADS scores 
accounted for around 70% of the variance in emotion rec-
ognition with Orginal Human pictures (F(1,13) = 49.183, 
p < .001, R2 = .791, B = .263, Beta = .889, t = 7.01, 
p < .001), compared to only around 30% with the Ani-
mal Filter pictures. (F(1,13) = 6.392, p = .025, R2 = .33, 
B = .145, Beta = .574, t = 2.528, p = .025.
We also performed exploratory analyses to identify 
whether the above effects were driven by particular emo-
tions. We performed five separate Fischer’s exact tests ana-
lysing hits and misses across the two presentation types 
(human and animal) for each emotion separately. These 
analyses suggested that these results were likely driven 
by greater performance with the animal filtered pictures 
compared to human for the happy and angry emotions, but 
not sad, surprised or afraid (see Table 3 for total number 
of hits and Fischer’s exact values for each emotion type).
Discussion
Our results indicate that participants had a 70% success rate 
when identifying the emotional expressions of faces in the 
Animal Filter condition, and in contrast had only a 50% 
success rate in the Original Human condition. Participants’ 
GADS scores proved to be a much greater indicator of emo-
tion recognition abilities for human rather than animal faces, 
though both were significantly predictive. Previous research 
on this topic shows that autistic individuals with mean IQ 
scores in the average range have improved ToM ability when 
social agents are non-human rather than human (Atherton 
and Cross 2018). This study indicates that this pattern per-
sists throughout the wider spectrum, as individuals with 
autism considered to be low functioning, many of whom also 
possessed a co-occurring ID also show improved ToM when 
evaluating non-human versus human agents. Such findings 
are important as they allow for greater understanding of the 
similarities of individuals with varying levels of functional 
ability.
Of interest in this study is to situate results with previ-
ous work looking at performance on emotion recognition 
in individuals with ASD, particularly as those with more 
severe autism are rarely studied in the context of ToM. For 
instance, as previously discussed, Sucksmith et al. (2013) 
found that adults with ASD were impaired when identifying 
emotions happy, angry, on the KDEF, while those without 
ASD showed no difference between emotions. Of interest 
is that in the present study the two emotions driving the 
effect were also happy and angry, not afraid. In relation 
to the ability to recognize the animal version of ‘happy’ 
in our sample, Silva et al. (2015) found that children with 
ASD showed avoidance towards happy human faces, while 
approaching happy cartoon faces. Thus, it may be that posi-
tive emotions in human faces have different associations for 
those with ASD which affect identification, and this can be 
improved when changing characteristics of the stimulus, 
such as anthropomorphizing them, which makes them more 
approachable to those with ASD.
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Fig. 1  Mean and standard errors of the mean for accuracy correct for 
each picture set
Table 3  Number of hits for each emotion type split by human versus 
animal presentation and Fishers exact inferential comparing hits and 
misses across presentation type
*p-value is significant at the .05 level
Emotion Human hits Animal hits Fishers 
exact p 
values
Happy 16 30 p < .001*
Angry 17 26 p = .02*
Surprised 15 20 p = .295
Afraid 13 17 p = .439
Sad 17 17 p > .99
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Thus, it is clear, in line with the finding that 70% of 
GADS score variation was explained by the human KDEF 
measures, that ToM is an important predictor of symptom 
severity and development (Jones et al. 2018). As this pat-
tern has now been found in autistic people with co-occuring 
ID, as well as those with average IQ, it would be of future 
interest to conduct further research into the wider spectrum, 
and examine whether a similar pattern can be found in those 
with sub-clinical autistic traits levels. Exploring the stability 
of this effect independent of IQ may help uncover underly-
ing, shared characteristics of an undeniably diverse group of 
individuals, thus improving our understanding of the core 
features of the autism phenotype.
While still speculative, there are several theories as to 
why autistic people may have differential ToM skills when 
decoding non-human rather than human faces. While it has 
been theorized that autistic people may have comparatively 
reduced social interests (Chevallier et al. 2012), studies such 
as this one and others instead suggest that social interest in 
autistic people may fluctuate depending on whether an agent 
is typically human or non-human. For instance, research 
shows typical face exploration, including increased attention 
to eye regions, in autistic samples when faces are presented 
as animal rather than human (Grandgeorge et al. 2016), and 
typical neural activation patterns when faces are presented 
as cartoons rather than humans (Whyte et al. 2016).
The role of motivation in ToM connects with a broader 
implication of this research, which is that non-human 
stimuli may be especially rewarding to the autistic popu-
lation. A large body of work suggests that autistic people 
have a particular affinity and increased social responsive-
ness towards animals, and while experiencing anxiety dur-
ing human contact, this can be ameliorated through animal 
contact (O’Haire et al. 2013). Examination of neural reward 
responses patterns indicate that autistic people find it more 
rewarding to view animal rather than human faces (Whyte 
et al. 2016).
While autistic people have been theorized to be in less 
need of social contact than their typically developed (TD) 
peers, a number of studies rebut this characterization, 
showing that autistic people report the same degree of 
social interest as those with TD (Cowart et al. 2004). How-
ever, stemming from social differences, autistic people can 
suffer from exclusion in peer settings (Kasari et al. 2011), 
and report feeling more lonely than their TD peers (Las-
gaard et al. 2010). Thus, it may be possible that a result-
ing decrease in social self-efficacy causes autistic people 
to find solace and social reward in non-human agents, 
which may result in stronger ToM performance when the 
agent in question is non-human rather than human. With 
this in mind, it becomes clear that in order to fully under-
stand ToM in autism it is necessary to move beyond the 
framework of ‘intact’ or ‘impaired.’ Instead, researchers 
must consider the context in which an autistic person has 
learned ToM, and how this has shaped their desires or 
beliefs about mental state processing.
It is important to note the limitations to this study. First, 
individuals in this study were identified by occupational 
therapists as having need for significant supports, and 
were thus educated in special educational settings befit-
ting individuals with severe disability, and exact measures 
of cognitive ability such as IQ were not obtained. While 
this opens the interpretation of the analysis to possible 
confounds regarding heterogeneity in cognitive ability 
between participants, this is in many ways an unavoidable 
issue when conducting research on this portion of the ASD 
population. For instance, research indicates that particu-
larly in individuals with more severe ASD related symp-
toms, cognitive performance shows peaks and troughs 
across domains, and there is no specific cognitive profile 
associated with ASD (Charman et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
individuals with ASD who also show communicative dif-
ficulties are significantly more likely to show poor IQ test 
performance (Hoekstra et al. 2009). Thus, it can be dif-
ficult to directly test individuals with severe ASD symp-
toms, such as those in this sample, in a way that reveals a 
true IQ score independent of communicative impairment 
and reflects the variability in performance across various 
subscales. For this reason, it was decided to instead uti-
lize the assessments of on-site specialists with an in-depth 
knowledge of the participants to situate their developmen-
tal functioning within the broader autism spectrum. Addi-
tionally, it would be of interest to explore visual saccades 
and obtain more detailed data from eye tracking in relation 
to face recognition in ASD, specifically comparing visual 
saccade patterns when viewing human and animal faces.
Despite these limitations, this study examined ToM 
ability not only with regard to stimulus type, but also to 
devise a means to test a portion of the autism population 
that is not typically assessed on ToM. For instance, as 
discussed by Jarrold and Brock (2004), in order to isolate 
the specific domain of impairment relative to controls, 
the majority of autism research is conducted on people 
with autism who also have average to above average IQ 
and whose developmental age matches their chronologi-
cal age. The limitation therein is that those with lower 
developmental ages, IQ scores and who possess co-occur-
ring intellectual disabilities are not represented in autism 
research, and findings can not necessarily be generalized to 
such individuals. Thus, in this study we demonstrate a way 
to simplify the KDEF testing process, thus allowing for 
greater inclusion in facial recognition tests for those with 
autism, and shedding light on possible ToM mechanisms 
for a greater proportion of the autism spectrum.
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